Game Theory Applications in Managerial Accounting and Finance
Dr. Rajendra Singh
Associate Professor, HOD Department of Mathematics, Off. Principal MBP.G. College, Dadri, G.B. Nagar
Neelam Singh
Associate Professor, HOD, Department of Economics, VMLG College, Ghaziabad
34-51
Vol: 11, Issue: 4, 2021
Receiving Date:
2021-07-28
Acceptance Date:
2021-10-03
Publication Date:
2021-11-05
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http://doi.org/10.37648/ijrst.v11i04.005
Abstract
Strategic interactions among rational decision-makers may be better understood with the help of game theory, a framework developed in the field of applied mathematics and economics. The importance and influence of game theory on organizational decision-making processes are illuminated by this paper's exploration of its applications in management accounting and finance. Insights into how game theory models might improve financial planning, risk management, and managerial decision-making are offered by the study's examination of the strategic interactions among investors, managers, and other stakeholders. This paper delves into the application of game theory to the study and optimization of pricing strategies, cost allocation, and performance measurement in the context of companies. A more thorough comprehension of how decisions affect overall performance and profitability may be gained by modeling the strategic interconnections across an organization's divisions or business units. In a fast-paced corporate world, managers may use game theory to their advantage by learning how their rivals will respond and then making calculated decisions based on that information.
Keywords:
Game Theory; Applications; Managerial Accounting; finance
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